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rocketed and we had a “crisis” on our hands. 
Is more regulation the answer to failed regulation? In Wash-
ington, the answer usually is yes. So, questionable auditing of
public companies is addressed by a raft of restrictions on audi-
tors and a quasi-governmental entity to regulate auditors
under sec control. A lack of sec oversight is answered by a
mandate for periodic review of all public company filings by
the sec. The failure of prosecutors to pursue corporate malfea-
sance leads to new criminal sanctions for prosecutors to use
(or continue to ignore). And, of course, Congress throws more
money at the “crisis.”
Some of the new reforms may help improve the quality of
financial reporting. Others, such as longer prison terms for
fraud, are election-year posturing and unlikely to add much
additional deterrence. The changes have, however, added to the
expense and risk of being a public company. Premiums for
directors’ and officers’ insurance have gone up sharply, as have
auditors’ fees. Those expenses will be passed along to share-
holders in the form of a diminished corporate bottom line. And
shareholders can expect to pay again when companies are hit
by a fresh wave of lawsuits that the new legislation encourages.
Finally, by threatening foreign ceos with jail time, Congress has
handed London a great marketing weapon in its competition
for listings with New York.
New financial markets Is more government the only answer
to shaken investor confidence? Although Congress is unlike-
ly to abandon big government anytime soon, self-regulation
remains an option for many developing countries. As devel-
oping economies have emerged from the quagmire of social-
ism and protectionism, financial markets have arisen as well.
Those countries must now choose their principal regulator: the
government or the market. The stakes are high for the fledg-
ling markets – countries that fail to establish regulatory struc-
tures that instill investor confidence may find stock trading
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nron, arthur andersen, tyco,
ImClone, WorldCom, Adelphia — as Amer-
ican investors reel from accounting scan-
dals and self-dealing by corporate insiders,
the question of trust in the securities mar-
kets has taken on a new urgency. Securities
markets cannot operate without trust. Mar-
kets known for fraud, insider trading, and manipulation risk a
downward spiral as investors depart in search of safer invest-
ments. Today, many investors are rethinking the wisdom of
entrusting their financial futures to the stock market. Absent
trust in the integrity of the securities markets, individuals will
hoard their money under the proverbial mattress.
Washington has responded to public outrage over corpo-
rate shenanigans by proposing a laundry list of new laws and
regulations to crack down on corporate abuses. Some of the
abuses, however, can be traced back to regulatory laxity. Until
recently, Congress had more important uses for the taxes gen-
erated from securities transactions than policing the securities
markets. An understaffed Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion long ago gave up periodic review of company filings
because it had other priorities. Accounting fraud ranked low
on the enforcement agenda, trailing the vendetta against insid-
er traders and the pursuit of teenagers engaged in Internet stock
scams. Justice Department prosecutors had no appetite for
explaining complicated accounting transactions to jurors; bank
robbery and drug trafficking afforded easier convictions. Only
in the late 1990s did the sec make financial reporting a prior-
ity. Once financials were put under the microscope, the agency
claimed itself to be shocked to find that chief financial officers
were playing fast and loose with the numbers. Once the sec
started looking at the books, the number of restatements sky-
E
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Securities exchanges can police market abuses if 
government provides them the needed tools.
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migrates to countries that have done a better job at protecting
investor interests.
Investors will be reluctant to invest and trade if they believe
that the markets are stacked against them. Therefore, financial
intermediaries seek to promote confidence in the integrity of
public offerings and the fairness of trading markets. That eco-
nomic incentive is a precondition to the establishment of fair
and efficient markets, but it is far from being sufficient. There
are many obstacles on the path to trust. To begin at the firm
level, every brokerage house wants its customers to believe that
it puts their interest first. A reputation for integrity is an essen-
tial marketing tool. But brokerage firms must act through their
employees, and sometimes the interests of those agents may
diverge from the interests of the firm. An external monitor may
help control the agency costs. Moreover, the line between rea-
sonable pursuit of profits and taking advantage of one’s cus-
tomer often will be unclear. Investors will have greater confi-
dence if an independent entity draws that line. Finally, an
individual brokerage house, acting alone, cannot control the
integrity of the trading environment where it matches its cus-
tomers’ orders with the orders of other investors. Nor can it
control the governance and management of the companies in
which it places its investors’ funds.
We need institutions with a broader reach to control those
risks: the securities exchanges or the government. Exchanges
can help create the trust that leads to deep and liquid securi-
ties markets by designing transparent trading mechanisms, vig-
ilantly monitoring trading, and imposing demanding disclo-
sure standards on companies. Government, too, has the
authority to protect investors. With a few exceptions, both
institutions are of sufficient scope to control the potential abus-
es that discourage investor participation in the securities mar-
kets. How should regulatory authority be allocated between
securities exchanges and the state?
EXCHANGE OR GOVERNMENT REGULATION?
Do exchanges or the government have better incentives to reg-
ulate? My answer: Exchange participants’ quest for trading vol-
ume is the best incentive for effective and efficient investor pro-
tection. Government actors, by contrast, will seek to avoid crisis
and scandal, which will have very different implications for
regulation and its costs.
Exchange incentives Exchanges live or die with trading volume.
Broker-dealers make a substantial portion of their revenues from
trading commissions; another chunk comes from trading for
their own accounts. More trading by customers obviously means
more commissions, but more liquid markets also enhance the
profitability of broker-dealers’ own trading. Exchanges attract
trading volume by encouraging companies to list their shares and
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by encouraging investors to trade in those listed shares. Those
two goals are largely consistent, as companies will want to list
their shares on exchanges that provide the greatest liquidity
because liquidity minimizes their cost of capital. 
Economic theory and empirical evidence support the propo-
sition that insider trading and market manipulation harm liq-
uidity, and there is little evidence of any offsetting gain in pric-
ing accuracy. The theory is relatively straightforward: Insider
traders hold information advantages over outsiders. Those
information asymmetries lead to trading profits — insiders buy
low and sell high. To avoid the corresponding trading losses, out-
siders would prefer to trade only with other outsiders. Securities
markets are anonymous, however, so outsiders have no way of
knowing when they are trading with an insider, but they do know
that they will systematically lose when they do. Market makers
who supply liquidity to the markets on an uninformed basis will
increase their spreads to reflect the possibility of dealing with an
insider. As a result, insider trading simply becomes a transaction
cost of all trading. Uninformed shareholders will discount the
amount that they are willing to pay for shares by their expected
losses from trading with insiders; they may attempt to avoid loss-
es from trading with insiders by trading less frequently. Less trad-
ing means less liquidity, and less liquid securities markets raise
the cost of trading. Consequently, insider trading reduces the
demand for trading services provided by the exchange. For that
reason, exchanges have long imposed disclosure requirements
on listed companies; disclosure reduces the information gap
between insiders and outsiders. More recently, they have devel-
oped sophisticated computer surveillance systems that allow
them to monitor trading to uncover abuse. 
Securities fraud by companies has the same effect on trading
volume — fraud will discourage investor participation if some-
one is aware of the deception and trades on the information. For
example, corporate officers who manipulate accounting num-
bers while dumping their stockholdings are engaged in both
fraud and insider trading, with predictable effects on liquidity.
Market manipulation also creates information asymmetries.
Attempts to manipulate share prices through the typical tech-
niques of wash sales, matched orders, and “touting” are all inher-
ently deceptive, and that deception creates an information asym-
metry between its perpetrators and other investors.
Consequently, exchanges will have an incentive to discourage
both fraud and manipulation. Breaches of fiduciary duty by bro-
kers have the same character: Brokers stepping in front of a cus-
tomer’s order can profit only by deceptively concealing their con-
duct from their customers. Brokers who provide credible
certification that they do not cheat their customers that way will
take business away from those who do not so certify.
Exchange incentives are less clear with regard to the other
form of manipulation: attempts to “corner” the market. Craig
Pirrong argues that attempts to corner a market may lead to
increased trading volume, thus undermining exchange incen-
tives to combat that form of manipulation. Exchanges’ lack of
incentive to regulate volume-increasing manipulation suggests
a path toward locating the dividing line between exchange and
government regulation. 
Exchanges sometimes play a role as certifying intermediaries
in requiring good governance from corporations that list on the
exchange. The Enron debacle has brought further demands on
American exchanges to play a role in certification. They have
responded by requiring more independent boards and share-
holder approval of options plans. But exchanges will have little
incentive to regulate unless the regulation promotes trading vol-
ume. Exchanges may play an important role in setting disclosure
standards for listing corporations and enforcing those standards
because of the relation between the availability of information
and liquidity. We cannot expect them, however, to play an impor-
tant investor protection role in other corporate governance ques-
tions such as the enforcement of fiduciary duties. Investors need
protection from executives like John Rigas (who treated the Adel-
phia corporate coffers as his own piggy bank), but self-dealing
has only a tenuous connection to trading volume. Government
regulation may be necessary to curb abuses of this type, partic-
ularly if longstanding practices must be overcome to bring com-
panies into line with current best practices.
Government incentives Government is more ambivalent
about trading volume. Policymakers recognize in the abstract
that encouraging liquid securities markets will facilitate capi-
tal formation, and thus, economic growth. On the other hand,
politicians and other policymakers also worry about “specu-
lative excesses” in the trading markets. Fortunately, govern-
mental concerns over excessive trading are likely to be sup-
pressed during bull markets when investors’ primary focus is
counting their gains and chasing the next “sure thing.”
Bear markets inevitably follow bull markets, however. Cor-
porate mismanagement and corruption can be obscured by ris-
ing stock prices in a bull market, but the dirty laundry has a way
of surfacing in bear markets. The bad news produces dissatis-
fied investors who clamor for government intervention. Politi-
cians who happily ignored ever-climbing stock markets
become profoundly interested in disclosure policy when the
S E C U R I T I E S  &  E X C H A N G E
Fraud discourages investor participation, with
predictable effects on liquidity. Thus, exchanges have a
strong incentive to discourage fraud and manipulation. 
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financial news migrates from the business page of the news-
paper to the front page. The accounting scandal du jour provides
an opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials called
“legislative hearings” to rake some greedy businessmen over the
coals, and then enact legislation to protect investor confidence.
The recent spectacle of politicians falling all over themselves
to outdo each other in “getting tough on corporate crime” is
only the latest chapter of political overreaction to the fallout of
corruption revealed by a bear market.
That dynamic means that demands for financial market reg-
ulation will arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills
over into the real economy. Crisis, however, does not create the
ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective poli-
cy interventions. Politicians will want to “do something,” even
if the proposed “something” may prove to be ineffective or coun-
terproductive. Responsible officials in government agencies will
be called to the carpet by legislators looking to hold someone
accountable for the market decline. Bureaucrats tend not to enjoy
such encounters. Not being paid very well, they expect to at least
lead quiet lives, which leads them to a strong preference for con-
servatism in regulation. From the bureaucrat’s perspective, the
optimal number of regulatory failures is zero. If a rule makes an
incremental contribution to the avoidance of a future crisis, gov-
ernment regulators may be quick to see the rule’s wisdom, dis-
counting its costs. Those costs will be borne by investors gen-
erally, in the form of small reductions in their investment returns
and disclosure documents that bury important information in
a sea of minutia. Those costs are sufficiently diffuse that they are
unlikely to generate a groundswell for regulatory reform. Thus,
the cumulative effect of regulation in response to crisis is a ratch-
et effect pushing toward greater, more intrusive regulation. It
may take multiple crises to push government regulations to the
point where they become a serious drag on the financial mar-
kets, but having reached that point, it becomes very difficult to
turn the ship of state toward less regulation. Interest groups that
benefit from the regulatory apparatus will fight hard to preserve
their prerogatives. Deregulation requires a mammoth (and
unusual) mustering of political will.
Government impartiality? Government regulation also poses
the risk that well-organized interest groups may exert undue
influence over policymakers. Critics of self-regulation com-
monly complain that market participants may be lax in regu-
lation because of the need to respond to competition. Com-
pared to what? The forces demanding less stringent regulation
from exchanges will demand the same from government. The
forces of rent seeking do not recognize any boundary between
the public and private spheres. Exchanges respond to the pref-
erences of broker-dealers and executives of listing companies
because they do not want to lose market share in listings and
trading volume. Governments respond to those same groups
because they are well organized, well financed, and have a
strong interest in lobbying politicians. The only difference is
that the rent seeking will be in the form of efforts to influence
political decision-making as opposed to being mediated
through the forces of competition. For example, corporations
poured millions of dollars into the campaign war chests of
strategically placed congressmen to head off the Financial
Accounting Standards Board’s efforts to require that options
grants be accounted for as an expense. Congress then bullied
the supposedly independent fasb into submission.
This investment in lobbying is not surprising. The crucial
point is that government has little incentive to reconcile the
conflict between corporate executives and brokers on the one
hand, and investors on the other, in the most cost-effective
manner. Identifying the competition for listings as a limit on
the regulatory zeal of the exchanges tells us nothing about
whether the government would do a better job. Allocating
authority to government redirects rent-seeking energy into the
public sphere, but it does not dissipate it.
The government’s attitude toward insider trading and manip-
ulation is also complicated. In addition to its effect on trading vol-
ume, insider trading raises moral issues that may have political
resonance. Insider trading is “unfair” because it involves a cor-
porate officer or an investment banker exploiting his position to
make (occasionally enormous) secret profits at the expense of
unwitting shareholders. Whether the moral outrage over insid-
er trading is driven by a sense of equity or envy, it carries potent
political appeal. Coming down hard on insider traders is an easy
sell; most voters have no opportunity to engage in insider trad-
ing themselves. Once the campaign against insider trading has
begun, regulators may lose sight of other priorities. In the Unit-
ed States, the 1980s saw important market players very publicly
hauled off in handcuffs, accused of insider trading. The charges
were later dropped against many of those arrested (this time
without a media presence) for lack of evidence. That minor set-
back did not hold back the rise of the prosecutor responsible for
those arrests, Rudolph Giulani, to political power. The sec sim-
ilarly benefited from the high profile attention it has received for
its “war” on insider trading. The in terrorem effect of this govern-
mental enthusiasm for pursuing insider traders is difficult to
quantify, but it is surely non-trivial. If insiders are cowed by those
efforts into selling their shares only when they believe that they
are undervalued, firms will be forced to pay greater sums in
stock-based compensation.
Lessons for others Those concerns about potential over-reg-
ulation may seem misplaced after a series of accounting scan-
dals. Although this is a natural reaction to regulatory failure,
countries just developing their regulatory regimes for their
securities markets must worry that those regulatory choices
may be path-dependent. The United States has the regulatory
scheme it does because of political choices that were made in
the wake of the market crash of October 1929. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt campaigned for, and Congress adopted, the
Exchange Act of 1934 to punish the New York Stock Exchange
for its perceived role in “causing” the depression that followed.
The choices made then have led the United States to the point
where regulation by the exchanges is done largely at the behest
of the sec. We cannot know what an autonomous scheme of
self-regulation would look like in the United States securities
markets today because that possibility was extinguished in
1934. Government regulation is far too entrenched in the Unit-
ed States for self-regulation to be a likely alternative today. For
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developing markets, however, the choice remains open. A
number of important securities markets, including Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Australia, continue to allocate primary regu-
latory authority to their exchanges. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXCHANGE AS REGULATOR
Exchange regulation provokes three principal objections:
 The exchanges can be subject to conflicts of interest.
 Some issuers can exert inappropriate influence on the
exchanges.
 The exchanges can produce a cartel of regulated firms. 
Those problems with exchange regulation, while manage-
able, have important implications for the scope of regulatory
authority allocated to exchanges.
Conflicts of interest Broker-dealers are not homogenous. Bro-
ker-dealers segment themselves to appeal to different market
sectors; some brokers cater to small investors while others spe-
cialize in institutional trading. Some brokers have a stronger
presence in investment banking, with less emphasis on trad-
ing services. Those different business models lead to different
perspectives on exchange governance, and could lead to dif-
fering views on the importance of regulation. For example, bro-
kers that cater to retail investors are likely to favor vigorous
enforcement of rules reducing information asymmetries
because their clients will benefit the most. Brokers with insti-
tutional clients, by contrast, may tolerate informational advan-
tages in the securities markets if (as seems likely) their clients
are the holders and beneficiaries of those advantages. How can
those competing interests be reconciled?
The economic answer is that the constituency having the
greater intensity of preference — backed by willingness to pay
— should see its views prevail. That outcome maximizes the
profits of the exchange membership as a whole. Although the
outcome is straightforward as a matter of economic theory, it
is no small thing to achieve as a matter of governance. If mem-
bers of the exchange each have one vote, brokers representing
small investors may outnumber brokers who deal with insti-
tutional investors, thereby allowing the preferences of small
investors to prevail. That result can occur even if the institu-
tional shareholders engage in more trading and contribute
more to the overall profits of the exchange’s membership.
Governance problems of that sort have driven the recent
trend toward demutualization, first by the Stockholm Stock
Exchange, and more recently by others, including nasdaq in
the United States. The nyse proposed a transition to private
ownership, but that move has stalled. Competition is driving
the transition from mutual ownership to for-profit public cor-
porations. The introduction of electronic trading systems
threatens the future of more traditional trading systems. Estab-
lished exchanges have found it difficult to update their own
trading systems in response because the shift to alternative
trading structures could destroy the livelihood of some
exchange members. With governance determined by vote, bro-
kers who are threatened can block changes even if they make
economic sense.
The obvious solution is to buy off the opposition of brokers
dependent upon the old trading system. The sticking point,
however, is who should fund the buyout? The equally obvious
answer is the brokerage firms (primarily those serving insti-
tutional clientele) that would benefit from the development of
new trading systems. But that solution presents daunting col-
lective-action problems. Who would be required to pay and
how much? A public offering promises a large sum of money
to grease that wheel.
In addition to providing the funding needed to buy out dis-
located brokerages, shifting from a mutual ownership struc-
ture to a publicly held corporate structure promises to facili-
tate sensible decisions concerning changes in trading platforms
and rules. A publicly held exchange controlled by profession-
al managers will adopt the trading system that maximizes the
demand for its trading services while minimizing its costs,
thereby maximizing profits for its investors.
The happy implication for exchange regulation is that the
trend toward public ownership should lead exchanges to adopt
regulatory structures that maximize the demand for trading
services at the least cost. Public owners will demand that
exchanges regulate to the point where the last dollar spent brings
in an added dollar in trading or listing fees, regardless of whose
ox is gored by that regulation. The shift from mutual ownership
to a publicly held, for-profit corporation makes the title “self-reg-
ulation” no longer apt. “Market regulation” might be a better
description. Member firms would no longer be regulating them-
selves, but would be subjecting themselves to external regulation
by an independent market. In some respects, that is simply a final
step on the path of private regulation from informal regulation
by member broker-dealers to the modern system delegating
enforcement to professional staffs. Public ownership is the last
step to a completely independent, but still market-based, regu-
latory structure. Exchanges with governance structures that pro-
vide independence from those being regulated have more cred-
ibility and can safely be given greater regulatory authority. 
Pandering to issuers Exchanges require disclosure to encour-
age investors to trade. The quest for trading volume will be tem-
pered, however, by the exchanges’ need to compete for listings.
That raises the concern that exchanges will be reluctant to
require full disclosure and impose sanctions on companies and
their officers for fear that they will discourage listings.
To be sure, exchanges will want to weigh the costs of dis-
closure against its benefits. They also will take care in sanc-
tioning insider trading, fraud, and manipulation because base-
less punishments will drive listings away. Exchanges will
investigate thoroughly before bringing claims against a listing
company and provide fair procedures to ensure that only the
guilty are sanctioned. Honest companies (i.e., those that have
adopted effective procedures to discourage their managers
from insider trading and deceptive financial practices) can sig-
nal their executives’ integrity by pre-committing the compa-
ny and its agents to pay sanctions if they have engaged in abu-
sive behavior. That signal, if credible, would reduce the
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companies’ cost of capital. Exchanges that under-invest in
deterring insider trading and manipulation will lose honest
companies, leaving behind those companies most likely to take
advantage of outside investors. Thus, accuracy in enforcement
leads to a “race to the top” as exchanges that prosecute only gen-
uine insider trading and manipulation will attract more listings.
The prediction that companies will seek exchanges with
strong disclosure requirements and enforcement becomes less
clear if we relax the assumption that corporate managers act as
faithful agents for their shareholders. Presumably, managers who
are willing to take advantage of their shareholders by engaging
in insider trading and fraud are also willing to impose agency
costs on their shareholders when making listing decisions. 
Companies making listing decisions can be divided into two
primary classes: startup companies that are considering initial
public offerings and deciding where to list their shares for the
first time, and established companies that are already listed and
have the option of switching exchanges. Agency costs are lower
for a start-up company because the corporate managers mak-
ing the listing decision usually own a substantial portion of the
company’s equity. In addition, they frequently are under the
watchful eye of the venture capitalists, who also hold sub-
stantial equity. If the managers list on an exchange that under-
enforces insider trading, manipulation, and fraud prohibitions,
investors will discount the amount that they are willing to pay
in the public offering. That discount will reflect the shares’ lower
value in the secondary trading markets resulting from expect-
ed trading losses. The discounting directly harms managers
selling shares in the public offering. Because managers in that
situation will internalize the costs of their decisions, we can
have confidence in their initial listing decisions.
Managers of already listed companies are less likely to inter-
nalize the costs of their decisions because they generally hold
a smaller portion of their companies’ equity. Moreover, they
may favor the interests of long-term shareholders over those
of short-term shareholders (who value liquidity more highly).
That concern is particularly acute in developing markets, which
have a high percentage of companies dominated by controlling
shareholders. As a result, managers of established companies
may favor exchanges with lax enforcement. On the other hand,
managers interested in trading profits paradoxically may pre-
fer a market with more stringent enforcement. Greater enforce-
ment produces more liquidity, which allows insider traders
greater latitude to disguise their trades among the many liq-
uidity trades. Whether the need for liquidity will dominate the
fear of sanctions is uncertain. Thus, we cannot have the same
degree of confidence in the listing decisions of managers of
established companies.  If managers obstruct the implemen-
tation of more stringent listing rules, exchange regulation will
be undermined.
The ability of an exchange to impose more stringent require-
ments will turn on the credibility of its threat to de-list compa-
nies that refuse to comply with the new rules. The credibility of
that threat will in turn be determined by the ability of de-listed
companies to obtain a listing providing comparable liquidity
elsewhere. For most developing countries, the primary com-
petitive threat is that their companies may decide to list their
securities in New York, Frankfurt, or London. The leading mar-
kets of the United States and Europe are anxious to get a share
of the trading volume for the most successful companies in the
developing world. But listing in New York or London, the most
prestigious alternatives, would put companies from developing
countries and their controlling shareholders under greater reg-
ulatory scrutiny than they are likely to face from even a more-
intrusive domestic exchange. The alternative of listing on a less
well-known exchange would send a clear signal to investors that
the controlling shareholder was indifferent to the protection of
minority shareholders, likely leading to a substantial decline in
the company’s share price. The primary victim of that decline
would be the controlling shareholder. Thus, the alternatives to
domestic listing will not put much competitive pressure on
domestic exchanges to be lenient in its regulation. The greater
concern for exchanges in the developing world has to be com-
panies seeking greater enforcement from better-established secu-
rities markets, not less enforcement from laxer ones.
Restraints of trade A perennial concern with self-regulation
is its potential use as a means for suppressing competition.
Exchange self-regulation historically has been used to enforce
cartel arrangements and punish cheating on those agreements,
allowing exchange members to extract monopoly prices for
trading services from investors.
While that history is a source of concern, government reg-
ulation of the securities markets is not the answer. The U.S.
experience suggests that government regulation by a special-
ized securities agency is more likely to protect cartel arrange-
ments than dismantle them. The sec quietly tolerated the price-
fixing arrangements of the nyse for close to 50 years, acting
to eliminate fixed commissions only under congressional pres-
sure. By then, competitive forces had undermined the fixed
commission system. If government intervention to prevent
cartelization were desired, it would make more sense to leave
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The greater concern for exchanges in the developing
world has to be companies seeking greater
enforcement from better-established exchanges.
Pritchard.Final  3/17/03  9:03 AM  Page 37
S E C U R I T I E S  &  E X C H A N G E
antitrust scrutiny to the competition authorities. The antitrust
agency, while lacking the industry expertise of the securities
agency, is far less likely to succumb to industry capture.
In any event, the risk of cartelization has diminished sub-
stantially with internationalization. When markets were geo-
graphically distinct, cartelization was a viable strategy for the
securities industry. Investors today, however, allocate their cap-
ital on a global basis. Markets that try to extract rents will lose
listings to markets that trade freely. Competition is the most
effective antidote to attempts to suppress competition. 
THE GOVERNMENT AS AUDITOR
OF EXCHANGE REGULATION
Governmental authority is necessary in some areas to enhance
the effectiveness of exchange regulation. That intervention must
be narrowly tailored, however, so that oversight does not become
de facto control. Government control over exchanges could
undermine their incentives to respond to market forces. Gov-
ernment intervention should be limited to providing exchanges
with authority to regulate and auditing regulation by exchanges
to provide investors with the information they need to evaluate
the integrity of the markets in which they trade.
Lack of jurisdiction Exchange regulation is hampered by the
exchanges’ lack of jurisdiction over non-members and lack of
criminal authority. Those holes in exchange authority reflect
the limitations of private, rather than state, regulation. Private
actors can regulate only those individuals and entities that con-
sent to regulation, and even that regulatory authority may be
limited by the state. 
The absence of state authority creates two potential prob-
lems for exchange regulation. First, there may be individuals
who engage in or facilitate misconduct such as insider trading
or fraud, but who are beyond the exchange’s enforcement
power. Both investigation and enforcement may require
authority over individuals who have not contracted with the
exchange. Second, civil sanctions will not deter insider trading
and manipulation, given the enormous profits available from
those activities and the relatively low probability of detection.
We need punitive sanctions to achieve adequate deterrence. 
Limited jurisdiction Exchanges currently rely on two forms
of authority to enforce their rules: listing agreements with cor-
porate issuers and membership rules that apply to broker/deal-
ers. In both cases, the power to regulate flows from contrac-
tual consent. The exchange’s power to exclude from its facilities
gives it the ability to regulate: Corporations can be de-listed if
they refuse to comply with disclosure requirements and bro-
ker-dealers can have their trading privileges terminated if they
manipulate trading. The power to exclude includes the lesser
authority to suspend temporarily. That authority, however,
misses a large part of the regulatory problem. Insider trading,
for example, is typically engaged in by individual corporate offi-
cers and brokers, not the entities for which they work, which
have their own incentives to discourage such abuses. Corpo-
rate officers are not parties to the listing agreement signed by
the corporation, and individual brokers are unlikely to be mem-
bers of the exchange. Effective regulation requires the power
to fine those individuals, terminate their employment, and
exclude them from positions of trust.
In the United States, legislation gives exchanges jurisdiction
over persons associated with broker-dealers, along with the
power to impose civil penalties on such persons. That solution
could work equally well with listed corporations. There remains
the problem of individuals unconnected to either listed corpo-
rations or broker-dealers who may engage in insider trading and
manipulation, or assist those who do. One solution to that prob-
lem is a mandatory contract, administered by the broker-deal-
ers, similar to the mandatory arbitration contracts that investors
sign in the United States. Anyone who desires to trade using the
facilities of the exchange would be required to agree to abide by
exchange rules and subject themselves to exchange penalties for
violating those rules. Statutory authority could provide the
exchanges with the tools necessary for investigating violations,
including the ability to interview individuals who might have
information concerning potential violations.
Criminal authority The question of criminal sanctions is
more complicated. It obviously is not politically feasible to del-
egate criminal authority to the exchange itself. More realisti-
cally, exchanges could be allowed to call upon the government
for criminal enforcement of violations of exchange rules. Enlist-
ing the state in the enforcement of private rules is not unusu-
al. For example, governments regularly prosecute individuals
for violations of property rights. Georgetown University allows
me to use the computer that I am using to write this essay. If I
give the computer to my nephew to use, I might find myself in
the D.C. jail. Violation of the terms of private contracts can have
criminal consequences. In the United States, insider trading is
defined in large part by contractual understandings between
private parties, but violation of those agreements leads to crim-
inal penalties. 
Criminal sanctions for violating exchange rules are a small step
from those existing practices. The exchange would determine dis-
closure requirements and prohibitions on insider trading and
manipulation, but the state would decide the appropriate crim-
inal sanctions for violations of those rules and would enforce
those sanctions through its ordinary criminal processes. 
Transparency of exchange regulation Critics of self-regulation
sometimes charge that exchanges avoid enforcing their own
rules because it might create bad publicity. That criticism under-
estimates the ability of sophisticated institutional investors to
evaluate the quality of regulation in different securities markets.
Liquidity levels vary dramatically across different nations.
Recent studies suggest that cross-national variations in
investors’ willingness to commit their funds depend in large
measure on the quality of regulation in that market. There clear-
ly is an international competition to attract investor capital, and
effective regulation provides a competitive advantage. Moreover,
it is unclear that government enforcement is any more trans-
parent than exchange enforcement; government regulators also
have an incentive to portray the markets within their jurisdic-
tion as uncorrupted. Revelation of widespread problems could
lead to adverse political consequences. Even if exchanges could
suppress information about violations, it does not follow that
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government should displace exchange regulation.
Enhancing transparency through government oversight  One
step short of government regulation would be the U.S. regime,
under which the sec oversees exchanges’ enforcement. Not
only can the sec sanction exchanges for non-compliance with
their own rules or the securities laws, the agency also must
approve any change in exchange rules and can change those
rules itself if it is dissatisfied with them. In addition, the sec
issues numerous rules of its own affecting the exchanges and
broker-dealers. Consequently, the exchanges have been all too
willing to implement regulatory proposals at the behest of the
sec, resulting in a self-regulatory veneer covering a govern-
ment regime. Exchanges subject to displacement by govern-
ment regulation essentially regulate the way the government
would. In the United States, industry participants perceive
exchange regulators as an arm of the sec. That is not regula-
tory competition.
Enhancing transparency through government auditing A less
intrusive approach can produce transparency without dis-
placing regulatory competition among the exchanges. Trans-
parency can be achieved through periodic review and report-
ing by government regulators of trading processes, random
screening of exchange investigations, and review of sanctions
imposed by the exchange. Institutional investors, in particular,
are likely to be avid consumers of such reports. The govern-
ment would report, however, on the exchange’s compliance
with its own rules. Government regulation would certify that
those rules were being enforced, not determine their content.
Government verification can enhance the credibility of
exchange regulation by ensuring that the exchange actually
enforces the rules that it advertises to the investing public, pro-
tecting their interests. Regulation is a service like any other, and
consumers who are informed about the quality of that service
trade off cost and quality in the way that best serves their inter-
ests. Government would be limited to facilitating the market
for regulation by providing the public good of information.
CONCLUSION
Securities markets cannot operate without trust. Investors can
trust exchanges to regulate because of their powerful incentive
to maximize trading volume. The many choices that investors
have today remind exchanges that investor protection is a cru-
cial part of their business. Investors will leave markets that fail
to protect investors to find markets that will. Government reg-
ulation, by contrast, is unlikely to be as responsive to the needs
of the securities markets and risks burdening investors with the
cost of unnecessary regulation.
Notwithstanding the advantages of exchange, government
must play a role even in a largely self-regulatory scheme. Gov-
ernment must provide exchanges with sufficient authority to
regulate and provide criminal enforcement of exchange rules
when necessary. In addition, government has an important role
to play in auditing the exchanges to ensure that they enforce
their rules as written. As President Ronald Reagan put it in
another context: “Trust, but verify.” Investors need to be able
to verify the quality of self-regulation when allocating their cap-
ital among different markets. Armed with that information,
investors can weigh for themselves the tradeoff between the
cost and quality of regulation. Auditing, however, should not
be allowed to slip into outright control. To exploit fully the
advantages of exchange regulation, exchanges must have dis-
cretion over the content of their rules. If exchanges become
government pawns, government priorities will dictate the form
and content of exchange regulation.
If government provides exchanges with the necessary tools,
financial markets can produce the regulation that encourages
investor participation while retaining the powerful incentive
provided by competition. As Adam Smith explained long ago,
competition is the most powerful tool known for channeling
man’s baser instincts toward the social good. Securities regu-
lation cannot afford to ignore that tool. 
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